The EU, Russia and a less common neighbourhood: lessons reinforced by the Vilnius summit by Stewart, Susan
www.ssoar.info
The EU, Russia and a less common
neighbourhood: lessons reinforced by the Vilnius
summit
Stewart, Susan
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Stellungnahme / comment
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Stewart, S. (2014). The EU, Russia and a less common neighbourhood: lessons reinforced by the Vilnius summit.
(SWP Comment, 3/2014). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik
und Sicherheit. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-391308
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
  Dr. Susan Stewart is Deputy Head of SWP’s Eastern Europe and Eurasia Division SWP Comments 3 





German Institute  
for International and 













The EU, Russia and a 
Less Common Neighbourhood 
Lessons Reinforced by the Vilnius Summit 
Susan Stewart 
The run-up to and outcomes of the Vilnius summit in November 2013 indicate that 
the Eastern Partnership is undergoing a period of crisis. This is primarily because the 
EU and its Eastern partners have not been successful at communicating their respec-
tive goals to each other and agreeing on viable methods for reaching them. The same 
applies to the EU-Russia relationship, which is becoming increasingly dysfunctional, 
especially with regard to the so-called common neighbourhood. Although the two 
policy areas interact, a clearer separation between them is currently more justified 
than a gradual conflation of the two approaches. The summit has highlighted a series 
of problems that, so far, have been addressed only sporadically or at the rhetorical 
level. The silver lining of Vilnius can be found in seeing it as an opportunity to analyze 
these problems systematically in order to modify existing policy to take better account 
of current realities. 
 
The events of the past months have called 
aspects of both the EU-Russia relationship 
and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) into ques-
tion. It has become clear that Russia and 
the EU do not share the same goals con-
cerning the development of the EU’s East-
ern partners. This fact has implications for 
other aspects of the EU-Russia relationship 
as well. At the same time, the focus on Rus-
sia’s actions has deflected attention from 
internal developments in the EaP countries, 
which should be central to the evolution of 
their relationship with the EU. It is time to 
intensify the focus on these developments, 
without losing sight of the impact the Rus-
sian factor can have on the EaP states as 
well as on their rapprochement with the 
EU. 
A review and ensuing revision of the 
EU’s approach to Russia is in order, as is 
a substantial modification of the Eastern 
Partnership. EU-Russia relations were last 
reviewed (in a relatively minimal fashion) 
in 2008, and the European Neighbour-
hood Policy review in 2010–2011 ended up 
being dominated by the impact of the Arab 
Spring on the policy and thus did not focus 
sufficiently on the EaP. It is time to remedy 
this situation by taking a critical look at 
both policies, in order to ensure their com-
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patibility while clarifying important dis-
tinctions between them. 
Russia’s approach to its neighbours 
In the run-up to the Vilnius summit, Russia 
began to exercise massive pressure on sev-
eral countries involved in the Eastern Part-
nership. Russian President Vladimir Putin 
managed – through a partially non-trans-
parent combination of threats and prom-
ises – to convince the Armenian President, 
Serzh Sarkisian, to declare Armenia’s inten-
tion to join the Customs Union, which 
currently consists of Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan. This decision generated annoy-
ance and perplexity not only in Armenia, 
but also in the other Customs Union mem-
bers. Their initially critical reaction dem-
onstrates that Russia is prepared to take 
unilateral decisions in the framework of 
the Customs Union and to impose them on 
the other members. The Russian treatment 
of Armenia further indicates that accession 
to the Customs Union is not based solely on 
the voluntary, sovereign decision of a can-
didate country, but can be induced by mak-
ing an offer the country’s leadership cannot 
afford to refuse. Both these conclusions fly 
in the face of previous statements by the 
Russian leadership regarding the character 
of the Customs Union and the planned 
Eurasian Economic Union, which allegedly 
take decisions based on the deliberations 
of a supranational organ consisting of rep-
resentatives of sovereign states that have 
voluntarily joined the organization. The 
developments further indicate that Russia 
is becoming nervous about the viability of 
the formats and believes it is necessary to 
introduce coercive methods, as well as to 
emphasize enlarging the Customs Union 
rather than focusing on the problematic 
issues involved with its deepening. 
Russia threatened Moldova as well, this 
time with difficulties for its citizens work-
ing in Russia and instability in Transnistria, 
should the Moldovan government further 
intensify its relations with the EU. In a 
visit to Moldova in September 2013, Dmitri 
Rogozin, Russian Deputy Prime Minister 
and Special Representative of the Russian 
President on Transnistria, mentioned both 
issues and further implied that Russia 
might limit gas exports to Moldova if it con-
tinued to pursue an Association Agreement. 
However, earlier Russian pressure in the 
form of a ban on Moldovan wines led to 
increased Moldovan independence from 
Russia in the trade area due to greater 
diversification of the wine trade following 
the adoption of EU standards. In the case 
of Moldova, the Russian pressure failed to 
prevent the initialling of the Association 
Agreement, which took place in Vilnius as 
planned. Further actions by Russia can be 
expected, however, should Moldova con-
tinue its process of rapprochement with 
the EU. As the Ukrainian case (see below) 
demonstrates, a package of simultaneous-
ly applied measures can have a negative 
impact on the willingness of the elite to 
deepen the country’s relationship with the 
Union. 
Finally, in summer 2013 Russia para-
lyzed most of the Russian-Ukrainian border 
trade by imposing additional checks and 
controls. This action was accompanied by 
clear statements by Russian officials that 
the point of the measures was to make the 
consequences of entering into a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement 
(DCFTA) with the EU clear to Ukraine. Short-
ly before the Vilnius summit, there were 
repeated meetings between the President of 
Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, and Putin. The 
exact content of their conversations is un-
known, but it is evident that the Russian 
side combined threats and promises with 
the aim of preventing an intensification of 
EU-Ukraine relations. Putin was successful 
to the extent that Yanukovych refused to 
sign the Agreement at the summit, despite 
attempts at a last-minute compromise by 
the EU. 
The developments sketched above indi-
cate that Russia is systematically attempt-
ing to undermine the Eastern Partnership 
and perceives it as an initiative that runs 
counter to key Russian interests. This per-
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ception has to do with Russia’s vision of 
itself as a great power, which, from the 
Russian perspective, goes hand in hand 
with a hegemonic approach to its immedi-
ate neighbourhood. Furthermore, the rap-
prochement of the EaP countries with the 
EU is viewed by some in Russia not only as 
preparation for an eventual accession, but 
also as the possible harbinger of NATO 
membership for these countries, which 
Russia desires to prevent at all costs. 
EU-Russia relations: Towards a more 
realistic approach 
This situation has several implications for 
the EU-Russia relationship. For one thing, 
it indicates that the idea of an agenda 
shared by the EU and Russia in the post-
Soviet space is misleading. Russia perceives 
the developments in this area as a zero-sum 
game and does not believe in the supposed 
win-win opportunities often advocated by 
the EU. In addition, Russia is more than 
willing to tolerate instability and economic 
weakness in the neighbouring countries, 
assuming they are accompanied by an in-
crease in Russian influence. In fact, Russia 
consciously contributes to rising instability 
and a deterioration of the economic situa-
tion in some, if not all, of these countries. 
Thus, Russia does not subscribe to the 
declared aims of the European Neighbour-
hood Policy, which attempts to achieve sta-
bility, security and prosperity in the sur-
rounding states. 
Which consequences does this have for 
EU-Russia relations? Even if a heightened 
awareness of the existing “integration com-
petition” has developed in Brussels over the 
past years, the premises on which the EU-
Russia relationship is based, along with its 
key documents, assume the presence of 
significant potential for joint efforts in the 
post-Soviet space. In particular the “Com-
mon Space” on external security was in-
tended to involve such cooperation as a 
major component. Specific projects such 
as the “Meseberg initiative” also assume 
that such collaboration is possible (e.g. 
with regard to the Transnistria conflict). 
However, Russia’s actions of the past 
months make a critical evaluation of these 
efforts necessary. With its approach to the 
countries of the Eastern Partnership, Russia 
has provided proof that the potential for 
constructive, results-oriented cooperation 
with regard to the EaP countries cannot be 
seen as a given. At the level of both docu-
ments and practice, a revision should occur 
to remove this and other faulty assump-
tions (e.g. regarding official Russian sup-
port for democratization and moderniza-
tion processes). One goal of the revision 
could be a public written assessment explic-
itly rejecting previous assumptions and 
streamlining policy to focus on areas where 
cooperation remains essential and progress 
can realistically be achieved. This would 
serve both as a signal to Russia regarding 
EU intentions and a basis for designing 
further initiatives as the relationship devel-
ops. The assessment could be conceived as a 
“living document”, to be modified as con-
ditions in both the EU and Russia change. 
Second, the recent developments raise 
the question of whether the EU is willing to 
enter into a geopolitical game with Russia, 
or in fact has already done so. The rhetoric 
coming from some Member States in the 
run-up to Vilnius, particularly with respect 
to signing an Association Agreement with 
Ukraine, points to pronounced geopolitical 
thinking by a growing number of actors. 
For instance, the opinion was frequently 
expressed that it was necessary to “rescue” 
Ukraine before it could drift further in 
Russia’s direction. This echoes the zero-sum 
approach prevalent in Moscow. Such geo-
political arguments largely overshadowed 
an evaluation of the domestic steps (not) 
undertaken by the Ukrainian government, 
except with regard to the case of Yulia 
Tymoshenko, which remained (too) high 
on the EU’s priority list. 
If one understands geopolitics as a strug-
gle for mutually exclusive influence in a 
particular area, then this game could be 
dangerous for the EU in two senses. First, 
an attempt to achieve EU goals in the 
 SWP Comments 3 
January 2014 
4 
neighbourhood by means of geopolitical 
instruments is at odds with the essence of 
EU foreign policy as it has developed so far. 
Nor is such an approach capable of creating 
the foundation for a constructive future 
policy towards Russia. Rather, it would lead 
to an escalation within the EU-Russia rela-
tionship, which would be based on zero-
sum thinking and would thereby promote 
an attitude that the EU has spent the pre-
vious years rejecting (or denying). Second, 
such a development would focus attention 
too strongly on Russia’s actions. These are 
certainly important when it comes to in-
fluencing the possibilities for development 
of the EaP. However, when modifying and 
implementing the Eastern Partnership, the 
political, economic and societal develop-
ments in the partner countries should be 
the primary focus, not the role of Russia 
(more on this below). 
The dysfunctional nature of EU-Russia 
relations with regard to the post-Soviet 
space corresponds to the general tendency 
of developments in the relationship. In the 
past year and a half, it has deteriorated in 
virtually every sphere. In the energy sector, 
the EU has accused Gazprom of distorting 
competition on the energy markets in 
various EU Member States. In the trade 
area, the EU has launched the first com-
plaint against Russia in the WTO frame-
work, pointing to a larger set of problems 
that have ensued due to Russia’s inade-
quate approach to its WTO commitments. 
Work on a new basic agreement has stalled. 
On the question of visa facilitation, the two 
parties have reached an impasse, due in 
part to new issues introduced by the Rus-
sian side. All of this emphasizes the neces-
sity of reviewing the fundamental assump-
tions of the relationship and working 
towards a more realistic approach. Such a 
review should go substantially beyond the 
process that occurred in 2008 following the 
Russia–Georgia war, which had little tan-
gible practical impact on the EU approach 
to the Russia dossier. With regard to the 
geopolitical game, the EU should not allow 
itself to become involved in a “tit for tat” 
relationship with Russia, but rather pursue 
its own goals in the neighbourhood proac-
tively. While remaining open to a dialogue 
with Russia to explain these goals, the EU 
should take into account likely Russian 
responses when planning its own actions – 
not in order to avoid antagonizing Russia 
at all costs, but rather to be prepared for 
potential consequences. 
The Eastern Partnership: Greater 
differentiation, more resources 
The above analysis shows that the EU’s 
approach to Russia on the one hand and 
the Eastern partner countries on the other 
are interrelated. It is nonetheless essential 
to keep the two approaches both analyti-
cally and practically separate from one an-
other and to enquire into the consequences 
of developments to date (including Russia’s 
actions) for the future of the EaP. The em-
phasis should be placed on what has oc-
curred in the countries themselves, rather 
than on Russia’s approach. 
There are limited elements of condition-
ality built into the EaP. For example, begin-
ning negotiations on an Association Agree-
ment is predicated on the demonstration of 
democratic values. The case of Ukraine has 
shown that the political environment in 
the partner country can change and that 
the question of adhering to certain values 
remains an open one. What is more, the 
fundamental direction of foreign policy 
in the Ukrainian case is – despite official 
rhetoric and legislation supporting the 
EU option – still undecided. Although the 
Ukrainian case is unique for a number of 
reasons, there are numerous similarities 
between its development and that of other 
EaP countries. Like Ukraine, Moldova also 
possesses an elite as well as a society that is 
divided in terms of foreign policy orienta-
tion. Events in Georgia since the parliamen-
tary elections in October 2012 have demon-
strated problems in the rule of law sphere 
in general, and with selective justice in par-
ticular, although not to the same degree as 
in Ukraine. 
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The EU has insisted on the validity of ex-
isting instruments. In the cases of Georgia 
and Moldova, this approach has functioned 
so far, although the parties are currently 
only at the stage of initialling the agree-
ments. Armenia has left the process, which 
points to the need for more instruments 
below the threshold of an Association 
Agreement and accompanying DCFTA. The 
Ukrainian case has highlighted the weak-
nesses of the EaP approach, even prior to 
Yanukovych’s decision not to sign the 
agreement. First, Ukraine, under its current 
leadership, is only interested in the agree-
ment for financial and geopolitical reasons, 
as a means of continuing its balancing act 
between the EU and Russia. Second, the 
Ukrainian bureaucracy is not in sufficiently 
good shape to implement much of the 
agreement effectively. Third, the process 
surrounding the signing has not contrib-
uted to bringing the Ukrainian leadership 
closer to the EU. Instead, the Ukrainian 
ruling elite has attempted to incorporate 
the document (and the process) into its 
corrupt and personalized style of govern-
ing, and thereby to profit from it both 
politically and monetarily. These three 
aspects make clear both the ambitious 
nature of the Association Agreement in 
post-Soviet contexts and the need to better 
understand how such instruments will be 
perceived and utilized within these con-
texts. 
One key result of the Vilnius summit 
should thus be a determination to more 
strongly differentiate the Eastern Partner-
ship approach. The European Neighbour-
hood Policy has de facto already divided 
into two parts, concerned with the East and 
the South, respectively. This division makes 
sense and has – at least in the case of the 
East – already borne fruit. However, it has 
become increasingly clear that the Eastern 
neighbours also differ among themselves 
across important parameters. This was to 
some extent evident even at the beginning 
of the EaP. For example, Belarus was only 
invited to participate in the multilateral – 
not the bilateral – dimension of the EaP 
because of its inadequacies in the areas of 
democracy and the rule of law. Differences 
with regard to levels of interest in the EU 
also quickly became obvious. Azerbaijan, in 
particular, has demonstrated little interest 
in the EaP offers. 
There are, however, other equally rele-
vant parameters for assessing the probable 
level of involvement of the partner states in 
the EaP. These include the form of govern-
ance practiced, the economic situation in 
the country, and the relations among poli-
tics, the economic sphere and society. The 
type and degree of dependence on Russia 
should be taken into account when analyz-
ing these parameters. The above factors are 
decisive for the respective country’s elite 
when it comes to evaluating the EU offers. 
Since the rhetoric of these elites can be 
misleading – as the situation both before 
and after Vilnius has shown – it would 
make sense for the EU to conduct its own 
assessment of the parameters mentioned, 
in order to be able to gauge the probable 
attractiveness of its offers from the point of 
view of the respective partner country. This 
is all the more necessary because objective 
analyses of this sort are rarely undertaken 
in the partner countries themselves. Their 
absence is an indication of the primarily 
political – and often instrumental – char-
acter of the relationship for the partner 
countries, as well as of the inadequate in-
volvement of economic and social actors 
in the decision-making process. Opinions 
present in the broader society should also 
be examined by EU analysts, in order to 
pinpoint potential supporters and oppo-
nents of the EU’s proposals. An exploration 
of the factors mentioned above will also 
allow EU institutions to better assess the 
challenges likely to arise when agreements 
with Eastern partners are being imple-
mented. An organized network of special-
ists on the EaP states, including researchers 
and activists in the partner countries, could 
help to achieve a more systematic treat-
ment of pertinent issues. It could make 
sense for the European Union Institute for 
Security Studies to take the lead in creating 
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such a network, drawing on existing con-
tacts and expertise present in the EU coun-
try delegations, the EaP Civil Society Forum 
and relevant EU institutions. 
In addition, a process of differentiation 
should occur at the level of instruments. 
Starting from the situation in each country, 
offers should be made that correspond both 
to the agenda of the country and that of the 
EU. These offers should be relatively small 
in scope and be easy to absorb, that is, they 
should ideally involve only one area of 
reform and promise fairly quick – if limited 
– advantages, focusing especially on im-
provements in socioeconomic development 
and living standards. The art of designing 
such “building blocks” lies in sequencing 
them so that they enhance each other and 
fit into a sensible overall strategy for the 
country’s development. 
All of this will require an expansion of 
the resources devoted to the Eastern Part-
nership. This refers less to large amounts 
of supplementary financial assistance and 
more to targeted project funding to foster, 
for example, effective communication with 
the societies in the partner countries. Where 
necessary, additional human resources – 
both on the ground in the EU delegations 
and in Brussels – should be employed to 
facilitate the analysis described above as 
well as the development of appropriate 
“building blocks”. Monitoring mechanisms 
should also be expanded and fine-tuned to 
ensure that the support provided actually 
flows into the intended channels and is 
utilized for the agreed-upon purposes. 
Ukraine: Forward-looking 
crisis management 
Ukraine demands particular attention due 
to the protests that have emerged in the 
context of the Vilnius summit. Some of the 
suggestions formulated above can be rele-
vant to the Ukrainian case. First, however, 
the situation in the country needs to sta-
bilize. This will require steps that only 
actors within Ukraine can take. The EU can 
play a positive role, albeit a limited one. 
The immediate focus should involve 
establishing a dialogue between the coun-
try’s political leadership, on the one hand, 
and the opposition and pro-European seg-
ments of society on the other. Although 
Yanukovych has temporarily regained the 
upper hand due to his successful negotia-
tion of short-term Russian support, the 
tension in Ukrainian politics and society is 
not going to disappear. Since a tradition of 
political compromise is absent in Ukraine, 
such a dialogue would ideally involve exter-
nal mediation. As the EU is not likely to 
be seen as impartial by the Yanukovych 
regime, options for external mediators 
will need to be sought elsewhere, such as 
in the OSCE, under the current Swiss Chair-
manship, or the United Nations. The most 
promising path for Ukraine’s relationship 
with the EU – at least under the current 
Ukrainian regime – would seem to be a new 
start, divorced from both the Association 
Agreement and the fate of Yulia Tymo-
shenko. 
The past weeks have clearly shown that 
statements made by the Ukrainian leader-
ship cannot be taken at face value. It is also 
evident that Yanukovych’s primary concern 
is staying in power. If there is to be any 
chance of a transition away from the Yanu-
kovych regime, he will need to be con-
vinced that there is no alternative to leav-
ing and be offered watertight guarantees 
for his future that include both his own 
personal safety and the security of his 
family’s accumulated wealth. However, the 
December 2013 agreements with Russia on 
a lower gas price and multibillion-dollar 
loans have decreased Yanukovych’s sense 
of vulnerability and make it less likely 
that he will be willing to compromise both 
internally (with the opposition and broader 
society) and externally (with the EU and 
the IMF). The opposition, meanwhile, is not 
prepared to assume power, having no co-
herent programme, no clear leader and 
no concrete plan for transforming the dys-
functional governance structures of the 
previous two decades into effective insti-
tutions. Not to mention that any new lead-
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er would immediately come under pressure 
from Moscow, which can consist of threats 
but also of temptations, such as those to 
which Yanukovych has recently succumbed. 
In this situation, a modified EaP, which 
could offer small “building blocks” that 
deliver positive results quickly, may prove 
to be a palatable proposal, both for Yanu-
kovych and for his eventual successor. 
These smaller measures would, however, 
probably need to be accompanied by a 
significant IMF package in the medium 
term, since limited projects can only bear 
fruit in a country with a functioning econ-
omy, and the agreements with the Russian 
Federation will bring only short-term bene-
fits, combined with increasing Ukrainian 
dependence on Russia. A window of oppor-
tunity for cooperation with the IMF may 
open after the presidential elections sched-
uled for March 2015. However, it is equally 
possible that Russia will establish a tighter 
economic hold on Ukraine in the coming 
months, reducing the chances for the 
reforms demanded by the IMF. 
One option for a “building block” in the 
EU-Ukraine relationship would be the rapid 
introduction of visa freedom for short-term 
travel in the EU, which would serve both to 
support a potential new leadership and to 
send a positive signal to Ukrainian citizens. 
If an exception is to be made for Ukraine, 
however, in terms of exempting it (at least 
temporarily) from certain obligations listed 
in the Visa Liberalization Action Plan 
(VLAP), this should be discussed with the 
Moldovan elite. Moldova has fulfilled all 
benchmarks of its own VLAP and would be 
likely to perceive exceptions for Ukraine 
as unjust. On the other hand, the current 
Moldovan elite has an interest in seeing 
Ukraine follow a pro-EU path, and thus 
might be willing to support making an 
exception for its neighbour. At the very 
least, however, Moldova should receive visa 
exemptions before they are introduced for 
Ukraine, along the lines of those recom-
mended by the European Commission in 
November 2013. 
The question of financial support for 
Ukraine will inevitably continue to be 
raised, whether or not Yanukovych remains 
in power. If he does, it will be crucial not 
to disburse any funds to his regime without 
imposing clear and strict conditions that 
can be closely monitored. Any other ap-
proach will simply bolster the regime and 
its deeply flawed approach to governance. 
Uncontrolled funds will be used to reward 
Yanukovych’s supporters and to increase 
his chances in the presidential elections. 
Serious reforms will not be pursued, as they 
are not in the interest of key players and 
could jeopardize Yanukovych’s already 
meagre backing among the population. EU 
willingness to allocate funds without the 
proper monitoring mechanisms would also 
confirm Yanukovych’s view that the EU is 
ready to bargain and may be willing to out-
bid the Russians. His tactic of playing the 
two sides off one another without address-
ing substantive domestic issues would 
therefore be reinforced. 
The EU should attempt to increase the 
probability of a stable and peaceful period 
of transition – to what is currently unclear 
– by abandoning the question of the Asso-
ciation Agreement for now and focusing on 
smaller offers, as well as facilitating domes-
tic compromise to the extent possible. If 
and when a different set of actors should 
gain power, it will be essential to follow 
developments closely, build up reliable 
channels of communication and clearly 
articulate the EU’s priorities with regard 
to Ukraine. Any support given should be 
targeted to correspond to these priorities. It 
will be essential to observe whether flawed 
governance patterns are reproduced or 
rejected, and to offer support in establish-
ing new, more transparent and efficient 
methods. Even under a different leadership, 
financial support should be coupled with 
clear conditions, which can be negotiated 
with the new power holders. If, however, 
Yanukovych should remain in power for 
the foreseeable future, bolstered by Russian 
assistance, the EU will need to brace for 
continued frustration in its relationship 
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with the Ukrainian elite and search all the 
harder for opportunities to strengthen its 
interactions with Ukrainian society. 
Russia policy and the EaP: 
Linkage without conflation 
The Eastern Partnership and the EU’s policy 
towards Russia interact in multiple ways. 
One significant connection has been based 
on the assumption that cooperation be-
tween the EU and Russia to achieve shared 
goals in the neighbourhood is currently 
possible. The developments surrounding 
the Vilnius summit have revealed this 
assumption to be false. This means that a 
clearer separation of the two policies along 
this dimension is appropriate. On the other 
hand, the approaches remain interrelated. 
The pursuit of EU goals in the EaP countries 
will inevitably have a negative impact on 
certain aspects of the EU-Russia relation-
ship. A higher priority for the EaP than it 
has previously enjoyed seems appropriate, 
but that will create difficulties for the EU in 
its relations with Russia unless, and until, 
the zero-sum mentality can be overcome. 
Since the EU can do little to alter this men-
tality in the short term, it must prepare 
for difficult situations, for example con-
cerning the protracted conflicts, while 
making an effort to be as transparent as 
possible regarding its intentions towards 
the neighbourhood. Russia will probably 
become weaker internally, since it has not 
yet begun to pursue a serious course of 
modernization, so compensatory measures 
in the neighbourhood are likely, making 
the relationship in the economic and secu-
rity spheres more problematic. There will 
thus be a certain amount of spillover of 
the disagreements regarding the common 
neighbourhood into other aspects of the 
EU-Russia relationship. It may become in-
creasingly difficult to separate the various 
areas from one another and to cooperate in 
one while “agreeing to disagree” in others. 
The current situation in Ukraine re-
quires some form of crisis management 
rather than the usual EaP approach. None-
theless, the EU should attempt to address 
the crisis with the larger goals of the EaP 
in mind, while simultaneously pursuing 
a “new realism” in the EU-Russia relation-
ship. Not only in the Ukrainian case can 
new, more focused instruments prove to 
be more manageable and attractive than 
the extremely ambitious Association Agree-
ments with their accompanying DCFTAs. 
Since these instruments will need to be 
tailored to the relevant country contexts, 
improved mechanisms for drawing on in-
depth knowledge of developments in the 
region will be essential for a successful re-
vamping of the EaP. 
To sum up, it is necessary to combine 
crisis management tools in the Ukrainian 
case with a modified EaP approach that 
offers a wider spectrum of instruments, 
including more limited proposals that 
yield tangible advantages in the short term. 
This approach should be linked to a revised 
Russia policy based on current realities, but 
a conflation of the two should be avoided. 
Rather, Russia should be seen as a factor to 
be taken into account in the implementa-
tion of the Eastern Partnership, while devel-
opments in the partner countries should 
remain at its centre. 
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